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AFTER WHITE v. ILLINOIS: FUNDAMENTAL
GUARANTEES TO A HOLLOW RIGHT TO
CONFRONT WITNESSES
PATRICIA W. BENNETTt
I. INTRODUCTION
Etched prominently in constitutional law, the Confrontation
Clause, found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, proclaims that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. . .. "I Since its inception, the Confrontation
Clause, "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty," '2
has stood as a bulwark against trials by anonymous accusers and
absentee witnesses, 3 seemingly requiring a face-to-face encounter
between the accuser and the accused. In tandem with its consti-
tutional counterpart, cross-examination, 4 the Confrontation Clause
has afforded those accused of a crime the privilege of measuring
the truth of adverse testimony by the yardstick of in-court inquiry.
Recently, in White v. Illinois,5 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the Confrontation Clause in its review of a defendant's
conviction at a trial in which only the words of the defendant's
t Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. The
author is a former Assistant United States Attorney and Assistant District
Attorney.
I wish to thank Jane Hicks, Jeffrey Jackson, Melinda Mullins, J. Allen
Smith, and Carol West for comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
3. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)
("The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal
defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the
right to conduct cross-examination.") (citing Delaware v. Fernsterer, 474 U.S.
15, 18-19 (1985) (per curiam)).
4. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("The right of cross-
examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the
constitutional right of confrontation .. .
5. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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accuser, but not the accuser herself, had appeared. The accused,
Randall D. White, was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal
sexual assault on a four-year-old female child who never testified
at the defendant's trial.6 White maintained on appeal that the trial
court's receipt of the child's hearsay testimony was error and that
his rights under the Confrontation Clause had been violated. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed and, concomitantly, fash-
ioned a disquieting construction of the Confrontation Clause to
accommodate the rules of hearsay evidence. The White Court's
construction of the Clause departs from the Clause's accorded
treatment in prior case law and promises to erode the hallowed
protections under the Confrontation Clause traditionally guaran-
teed to those accused of crime. 7
The thrust of this Article is three-fold: (1) to discuss the
historical aspects of the Confrontation Clause and its interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court, (2) to show that, with White
v. Illinois, the Supreme Court lost its moorings with previous
decisions and drifted into treacherous constitutional seas, and (3)
to suggest a textual construction of the Confrontation Clause that
would be harmonious with the hearsay rule while preserving the
rights of the accused to face their actual accusers.
II. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Original Scope
Most constitutional scholars agree that precisely what the fram-
ers had in mind when they created the Sixth Amendment is open
to debate.8 The Amendment sailed smoothly through ratification,
with only minor Congressional quarrel. 9 Still, some tracing of its
6. Id. at 739.
7. See Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the Supreme
Court's Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires a New Look at Con-frontation, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 145 (1993).
8. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174-75 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see William H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules,
and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in
Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529, 532 (1974); James W. Jennings, Note,
Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742 (1965); Comment, Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 n.10 (1966) (citing HELLER, infra
note 13, as "the only historical illumination the clause has received.").
9. See Green, 399 U.S. at 175-76 (Harlan, J., concurring); 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. (1789-1790).
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background is possible.' 0 Studies of its background have convinced
most constitutional scholars that the purpose of the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause was to address trial by ex parte
affidavit." During exparte affidavit proceedings, the accused faced
criminal charges which the prosecuting attorney would endeavor
to prove by reading confessions of accomplices, depositions, letters,
and other documentary proof.' 2 Predictably, the accused were
irritated about "proof" from unseen, unheard witnesses. Accord-
ingly, the accused frequently demanded that their accusers be
brought to face them. 3 Those on trial also demanded the right to
present their own witnesses.' 4 Hence, those accused believed that
the right to confront their accusers, and the right to summon
witnesses, were important protections necessary to a meaningful
defense.
Eventually, in 1791, the Sixth Amendment was incorporated
into our Constitution. 5 Much later, in 1965, the United States
Supreme Court, through the conduit of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, applied the Confrontation Clause to the states.' 6 While the
language of the Confrontation Clause admits of easy reading, the
meaning of its key phrase, "the witnesses against him," defies any
ready, unanimous interpretation. Over the years, scholarly camps
espousing various interpretations, have formed and warred over
the pedigree and thrust of the phrase. 7
10. See 5 WIGMoRE, EVIENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); 9 WLLIAm
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 177-87, 214-19 (reprint 1966) (3d ed.
1944); Jennings, supra note 8, at 746-47; Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination
and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939, 953 (1968).
11. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); see, e.g., Green,
399 U.S. at 156, 179 (Harlan, J., concurring), 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also 5 WiGMORE, supra note 10, § 1395.
12. See 1 JAmEs F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
326 (1883).
13. See FRANcIs H. HELLER, THE SIxTH AMENDMENT 104 (reprint 1969)
(1951); Harry L. Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE RoYAL HIsToRIcAL SOcIETY 172 (4th Cir. 1919); Baker, supra note 8, at 532-
33.
14. See HELLER, supra note 13, at 106-08.
15. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (Joseph Gales ed. 1789).
16. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
17. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844-50 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1015-20 (1988); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1364; Baker, supra note
8, at 532. See generally Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay:
Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 665, 677-82 (1986) (discussing the positions of various scholars); Daniel H.
Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB.
L. 381 (1959).
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The debate over the meaning of the phrase remains intense
because of the impact that any settled interpretation would pose
to the hearsay rule. Scholars vigorously disagree as to what effect
the Confrontation Clause has upon the admissibility of hearsay
evidence. 8 A plain reading of the Sixth Amendment convinces
some that the Clause aims to bar all forms of hearsay evidence. 9
Others contend that the Clause was intended to be read in con-
junction with the hearsay rule and to permit limited types of
hearsay evidence. 20
The Wigmore-Harlan view regards the phrase, "the witnesses
against him," as preserving to the parties at trial the right to cross-
examine only those witnesses who actually testify in person. 2' The
accused simply has the right to cross-examine in court any witness
from whom hearsay is elicited. The Wigmore-Harlan view does
not interpret the Clause as requiring in court the actual declarant
of the hearsay statement. Under this interpretation, no conflict
arises between the Confrontation Clause and the rules of hearsay
evidence. At the other extreme is the interpretation that demands
the presence in court of any witness whose statement is to be
offered against the accused 22 Obviously, this literal interpretation
would bar all forms of hearsay evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected both extreme
interpretations, opting instead to accommodate some forms of
hearsay, while providing for a limited right of confrontation.2 In
White, its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Court
stated that "we have consistently sought to 'stee[r] a middle course'
... that recognizes that 'hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,' . . . and
18. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as follows: 'Hearsay'
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED.
R. Evm. 801(c).
19. See Baker, supra note 8, at 540 (such a view is "rightly viewed as
unfortunate.., and seems to be supported by neither history, logic, nor Supreme
Court precedent.").
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1397.
21. See generally Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the result); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1397.
22. See Baker, supra note 8, at 539-40.
23. See, e.g., United States v. rnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
[Vol. 40:159
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'stem from the same roots." ' 24 Accordingly, the White Court held
that, "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of relia-
bility to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule,
the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." 25 While the Court pro-
claimed that its trek to this eventual constitutional resting point
had been done "consistently,' '26 a review of the prior case law
suggests otherwise.
B. The Force of Precedent
A perusal of the early cases that examined the friction between
the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay exceptions is revealing.
Virtually all of the pre-White cases addressing the subject involved
one of the three following hearsay exceptions: (1) dying declara-
tions, (2) former testimony, or (3) statements of a co-conspirator.
Not until White did the Court hold that hearsay exceptions in
addition to the above three satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 27 At
first glance, one might consider this observation to be surprising,
given the number of hearsay exceptions which exist. 28 What is
clear, however, is that White represents a complete break from
earlier cases.
24. 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68
(1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)).
25. Id. at 743.
26. Id. at 741.
27. Id. at 743 (spontaneous declarations and statements made for medical
treatments).
28. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 provides the following twenty-four ex-
ceptions: (1) Present sense impression; (2) Excited utterance; (3) Then existing
mental, emotional, or physical condition; (4) Statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment; (5) Recorded recollection; (6) Records of regularly con-
ducted activity; (7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (6); (8) Public records and reports; (9) Records of vital
statistics; (10) Absence of public record or entry; (11) Records of religious
organizations; (12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates; (13) Family
records; (14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property; (15) State-
ments in documents affecting an interest in property; (16) Statements in ancient
documents; (17) Market reports, commercial publications; (18) Learned treatises;
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history; (20) Reputation concerning
boundaries or general history; (21) Reputation as to character; (22) Judgment of
previous conviction; (23) Judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or
boundaries; and (24) Statements not specifically covered by the Rules but which
have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and which are pro-
bative, material and promote the interests of justice. FED. R. Evm. 803.
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1. Dying Declarations
The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule is promi-
nently discussed in Mattox v. United States.29 Although the issue
in Mattox did not involve a statement uttered by a declarant on
his deathbed, the court discussed the dying declaration exception
to the hearsay rule at length in dicta. 30 The Mattox Court observed
that:
[T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the
letter of the provision ["to be confronted with the witnesses
against him"] than the admission of dying declarations.
They are rarely made in the presence of the accused; they
are made without any opportunity for examination or cross-
examination; nor is the witness brought face to face with
the jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated
as competent testimony, and no one would have the har-
dihood at this day to question their admissibility. They are
admitted not in conformity with any general rule regarding
the admission of testimony, but as an exception to such
rules.3'
The Court's respect for this exception was based on two readily
identifiable reasons. First, age: the dying declaration exception has
a lineage which predates the Constitution itself.32 One scholar
maintains that it was the only exception to the right of confron-
tation which had life when the Sixth Amendment was adopted.13
Secondly, the dying declaration exception owes its prominence in
early case law to the underlying basis for the exception. At a time
when church and state were closer, the law ascribed especial respect
to the last words of one in the grip of certain, immediate death.
29. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
30. Id. at 240. The issue in Mattox concerned the admissibility of testimony
given at a previous trial. The common-law dying declaration principle admitted
into evidence statements made by a declarant whose death was being prosecuted
in a case of criminal homicide, when the statements related to the cause of the
declarant's death. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 10, §§ 1431-34. The Federal Rules
of Evidence Hearsay exception regarding a "statement under belief of impending
death" (the declarant need not die) has an unavailability requirement which
includes but is not limited to instances of death. See FED. R. EVID. 804 (emphasis
added).
31. 156 U.S. at 243-44.
32. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899).
33. See HELLER, supra note 13, at 105.
[Vol. 40:159
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Convinced that no one on his deathbed would risk eternal dam-
nation by expending his last sigh on a lie, the courts accorded
great credibility to dying declarations. 34
Constitutional scholars differ on what significance this histor-
ical hearsay exception has in reconciling the Confrontation Clause
with the hearsay rule. One body of thought has simply concluded
that the existence and vitality of the dying declaration exception
signify that the Framers expected the Confrontation Clause to be
read in conjunction with this particular exception. 35 Others have
gone further and concluded that the Framers expected the Con-
frontation Clause to be applied in harmony with all of the hearsay
exceptions.3 6 Still others maintain with equal vigor that the contin-
ued acceptance of the dying declaration hearsay exception proves
that the Framers contemplated that hearsay evidence would be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause only if the declarant
was unavailable to testify. They argue that an unavailability re-
quirement surely follows from the Framers' avowed purpose to
abolish trial by exparte affidavits when the declarant was available,
coupled with the Framers' concurrent decision to accept the ad-
missibility of dying declarations when the declarant is unavailable.3 7
Notwithstanding the Mattox Court's acceptance of the dying
declaration exception as not being offensive to the Confrontation
Clause, one must remember that the issue before the Mattox Court
had nothing to do with a dying declaration. The Court's discussion
of the matter is dicta. As such, one may question whether this
hearsay exception is offensive to the Confrontation Clause.3 8 How-
ever, the above consideration is inapposite to Mattox's accepted
reading, which has spawned a progeny of cases adopting its dicta
on the status of dying declarations under the Confrontation Clause. 39
Mattox now stands for the well-established principle that the dying
declaration exception to the hearsay rule does not offend the
Confrontation Clause. While one is left to speculate as to what
specific insight this assertion provides on the dispute over the
34. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892). (This case
should not be confused with Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1989), which
involved the same defendant).
35. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44.
36. See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1397.
37. See Baker, supra note 8, at 539-41.
38. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 557, 611-12 (1988); Note, supra note 10, at
942.
39. E.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899); Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
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relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule, Mattox makes at least one point clear: the Confrontation
Clause was never intended to eliminate all hearsay evidence. 40
2. Former Testimony
Most of the pre-White United States Supreme Court cases that
addressed the Confrontation Clause dealt with issues involving
former testimony. A brief review of a representative sampling of
the cases confirms this assertion and shows the precise issues before
the Court.
As early as 1878, the Court began to fashion its interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause. In Reynolds v. United States,4' the
defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of bigamy. At trial,
the defendant objected to the admission of a transcript of the
prior testimony of his alleged second wife.4 2 Her prior testimony
had been given in a former trial of the defendant for the same
offense but under a different indictment.4 3 The prior testimony of
the witness was introduced over the objection of the defendant. 4
On appeal, the Court held that the proffered testimony of the
absent witness was admissible45 because it was the same testimony
given at another trial of the defendant for the same offense4 and
the defendant had been present at the other trial and had been
allowed a full opportunity for cross-examination of the witness. 47
In 1895, the Court was called upon to interpret further the
Confrontation Clause. The context this time involved prior state-
ments of deceased witnesses. In Mattox v. United States,4 the
defendant was convicted of murder on retrial after his first con-
viction was overturned. 49 At the second trial, the prosecutor intro-
duced transcripts of the prior testimony of two witnesses, both
deceased at the time of the second trial. Each had testified and
40. 156 U.S. at 243 ("Many of [the Constitution's] provisions in the nature
of a Bill of Rights are subject to exceptions, recognized long before the adoption
of the Constitution .... Such exceptions were obviously intended to be re-
spected.").
41. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
42. Id. at 159.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 160.
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id. at 160-61.
47. Id. at 161.
48. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
49. See id. at 238.
[Vol. 40:159
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been cross-examined at the first trial.50 The defendant objected to
use of the prior testimony based on the Confrontation Clause.
The Court found no constitutional error in admitting the
transcripts of the prior trial testimony of the deceased witnesses.-'
It noted that the overwhelming case authority was to allow prior
testimony of a deceased witness "where the defendant was present
either at the examination of the deceased witness before a com-
mitting magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case .... "52
To justify this exception to the right of confrontation, the Court
reasoned that "[t]o say that a criminal, after having once been
convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot
free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness,
would be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable
extent. ' 53 Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court ruling
admitting the testimony at trial. 4
Motes v. United States"5 is another case decided at a time when
the Court was still defining the contours of the Confrontation
Clause. The issue in Motes was very similar to the one in Reynolds
in that the question before the Court dealt with the admissibility
of a transcript of prior testimony given at a preliminary exami-
nation by an absentee trial witness. The transcript of the prior
sworn testimony showed that the defendant had been given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.5 However, the Court
held that the admission of the transcript testimony into evidence
violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront the wit-
nesses against him because the witness' absence was "manifestly
due to the negligence of the officers of the Government.' '57 The
Court's decision was grounded on the maxim that "no one shall
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. '58
Later, in Pointer v. Texas,59 the Court held that "the Sixth
Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against
him is . . . a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the
50. Id. at 240.
51. Id. at 244.
52. Id. at 241.
53. Id. at 243.
54. Id. at 250.
55. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
56. Id. at 470-71.
57. Id. at 471.
58. Id. at 472 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159).
59. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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States by the Fourteenth Amendment.''6 In Pointer, the "chief
witness" for the State presented evidence against the defendant at
a preliminary hearing.6' At trial, the State offered the transcript
of the chief witness' testimony from the preliminary hearing after
introducing evidence that the witness had moved to another state.62
Counsel for the defendant unsuccessfully objected several times.6 1
The facts showed that at the preliminary hearing the defendant
had been "accorded the opportunity of cross examining witnesses
there against him.' ' However, the facts also showed that the
defendant did not have counsel at the preliminary hearing.65 There-
fore, the Court held that use of the transcript to convict the
defendant denied him the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment.6 6 Justice Black, writing the opinion for the
Court, observed that: "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon
which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unani-
mous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confron-
tation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal.' '67
In Douglas v. Alabama,68 the Court considered the meaning
of cross-examination and confrontation of a testifying witness.
The [defendant] and one Loyd were tried separately in
Alabama's Circuit Court on charges of assault with intent
to murder. Loyd was tried first and was found guilty. The
State then called Loyd as a witness at [defendant's] trial.
Because Loyd planned to appeal his conviction, his lawyer,
who also represented [defendant], advised Loyd to rely on
the privilege against self-incrimination and not to answer
any questions. When Loyd was sworn, the lawyer objected,
on self-incrimination grounds, "to this witness appearing
on the stand," but the objection was overruled. Loyd gave
his name and address but, invoking the privilege, refused
to answer any questions concerning the alleged crime. The
60. Id. at 403.
61. Id. at 401.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 401-02.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 401.
66. Id. at 408.
67. Id. at 405.
68. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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trial judge ruled that Loyd could not rely on the privilege
because of his conviction, and ordered him to answer, but
Loyd persisted in his refusal. The judge thereupon granted
the State Solicitor's motion "to declare [Loyd] a hostile
witness and give [the solicitor] the privilege of cross-ex-
amination." The Solicitor then produced a document said
to be a confession signed by Loyd. Under the guise of
cross-examination to refresh Loyd's recollection, the Solic-
itor purported to read from the document, pausing after
every few sentences to ask Loyd, in the presence of the
jury, "Did you make that statement?" Each time, Loyd
asserted the privilege and refused to answer, but the Solic-
itor continued this form of questioning until the entire
document had been read.69
Although the statements in the exchange were not technically
testimony, the Solicitor's recitation and Loyd's silence encouraged
the jury to infer that Loyd made the statements.70 The defendant
was unable to cross-examine Loyd about the statements imputed
to, but not admitted by, Loyd which formed a fundamental part
of the State's case against the petitioner.7' The Court held that
this procedure denied the petitioner his right to cross-examination
under the Confrontation Clause.72
In Brookhart v. Janis,3 the Supreme Court considered whether
an unusual trial procedure used in Ohio courts denied defendant
his "constitutional right to be confronted with and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him." 74 Having waived a trial by
jury, the defendant was convicted of forgery and other offenses
after a "prima facie trial. 7 5 Under this "special" Ohio trial
procedure, the defendant could not contest the prima facie case
proved by the State and could not cross-examine the witnesses.76
The Court pointed out that unless defendant had waived his
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the defendant's
69. Id. at 416-17.
70. Id. at 419.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 384 U.S. I (1966).
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 3, 6.
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constitutional rights would have been violated in two ways. He
would have been denied the right to cross-examine the witnesses
who testified against him, and he would have been denied the
right to cross-examine a co-defendant whose statement was admit-
ted as evidence against him. 77 Guided by the State's admission that
"[ijf there was here a denial of cross-examination without waiver,
it would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it,''7s the
Court found that the defendant had not waived his right to cross-
examine witnesses and reversed the convictions.7 9
In Barber v. Page,80 the Court considered whether the State
violated the defendant's right to be confronted with witnesses
against him at his trial when the State's "principal evidence against
him consisted of the reading of a transcript of the preliminary
hearing testimony of [a co-defendant] who at the time of trial was
incarcerated ...."81 Counsel for the defendant did not cross-
examine the witness at the preliminary hearing, although an attor-
ney for a co-defendant did. 2
The Court found that "the State made absolutely no effort to
obtain the presence of [the witness] at trial . ,s"83 The Court
then stated that "a witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of
[an] exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prose-
cutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his
presence at trial." 84 Finding that the State had not made a good-
faith effort, the Court reversed the conviction and further stated
that it "would reach the same result on the facts of this case had
[defendant's] counsel actually cross-examined [the witness] at the
preliminary hearing. 785
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 8.
80. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
81. Id. at 720.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 723.
84. Id. at 724-25.
85. Id. at 725. In Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), the Court
granted certiorari to determine whether Barber "should be given retroactive
application." Id. at 315. The petitioner in Berger was convicted of robbery and
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. At petitioner's preliminary hearing, the
victim testified and the petitioner's attorney had an opportunity to cross-examine
the victim. However, at the time of petitioner's trial, the victim was outside the
State of California and did not testify, although the state had made attempts to
[Vol. 40:159
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In California v. Green, 6 the Supreme Court expounded at
length on confrontation and cross-examination. Defendant Green
was convicted of selling marijuana to a minor. The minor testified
against the defendant at the preliminary hearing and was thor-
oughly tested by extensive cross-examination by counsel for the
defendant. 87 The minor was the State's principal witness at the
bench trial.8 8 When the minor vacillated and became evasive on
his direct examination, the prosecution read excerpts from his
preliminary hearing testimony. 89 The excerpts were admitted as
substantive evidence, along with the statements of a police officer
testifying as to what the minor had told him. 90
The defendant was convicted, but the state appellate court
reversed, holding that the use of the minor's prior statements as
substantive evidence denied the defendant his right of confronta-
tion.91 The State appealed, and the United States Supreme Court
considered the narrow issue of whether the defendant's right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him was inconsistent with
the "substantive use of prior inconsistent statements." 9 2 The Court
stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that
the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of
hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
contact the victim by telephone. Id. at 314. Consequently, the Government
offered and the Court admitted the victim's preliminary hearing testimony into
evidence.
Though Barber was on appeal at the time of the lower court's decision in
Berger, the Court stated that the Barber decision should have been foreseen as
a result of the Court's earlier decision in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
The Barber decision, handed down shortly after the petitioner's convictions, held
"that the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction would not justify the use at
trial of preliminary hearing testimony unless the State had made a good-faith
effort to secure the witness' presence." 390 U.S. at 725. The only issue in Berger,
then, was whether the holding in Barber should be given retroactive effect. The
Court decided in favor of retroactive application and remanded the case for
reconsideration under the Barber standard. 393 U.S. at 314.
86. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
87. Id. at 151.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 151-52.
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id. at 153.
92. Id. at 155.
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common law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a
violation of confrontation values even though the state-
ments in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception. 93
The Court concluded that "the Confrontation Clause is not
violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long
as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and
effective cross-examination. ' 94 Thus, it held that the admission of
the minor's preliminary hearing testimony was constitutional. 9
In Mancusi v. Stubbs,96 the defendant objected to admission
of former testimony of a victim who subsequently left the coun-
try.97 The Court concluded that the defendant had been given "an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the victim] at the first
trial, and [his] counsel ... availed himself of that opportunity
93. Id. at 155-56 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
94. Id. at 158.
95. Id. at 170. Another issue in Green concerned the admissibility of the
minor's statements to a police officer. The minor "claimed at trial that he could
not remember the events that occurred after respondent telephoned him and
hence failed to give any current version of the more important events described
in his earlier statement." Id. at 168. After the minor's lapse of memory on the
witness stand, the police officer testified and recounted the minor's statement to
him that the respondent had supplied the marijuana. The trial court admitted
the statement as substantive evidence.
The Supreme Court said that the issue was not ripe for decision because
the trial court had based its decision on the erroneous premise that any out-of-
court statement of a witness is inadmissible as substantive evidence, regardless
of the opportunity to cross-examine at trial. Id. at 169. Therefore, the trial court
had not addressed the issue. Further, neither party had addressed the question
of the police officer's testimony and resolution would depend on facts which had
not been developed in the record. Id. at 169-70. In United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554 (1988), the Court resolved this issue and held that the admission of a
witness' prior "identification statement" would not violate the Confrontation
Clause if the witness was unable to testify due to memory loss. Id. at 564.
96. 408 U.S. 204 (1972). The case was before the Court for review of a
habeas corpus petition. The respondent had been convicted of murder in Ten-
nessee. The New York court had sought to use the Tennessee conviction to
sentence the respondent as a second offender. The merit of the Tennessee
conviction was at issue. Id. at 205.
97. The victim had returned to his native Sweden and had taken up
permanent residence there. Id. at 209.
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.... ,"98 Finding support for the lower court's determination that
the victim was unavailable for the second trial, the Court held
that there was "no constitutional error in permitting his prior-
recorded testimony to be read to the jury .... -99 The Court
stated that the transcript of the victim's prior trial testimony "bore
sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and afforded 'the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment."1 0
0
Finally, in Ohio v. Roberts,'0' the Court considered "the
constitutional propriety of the introduction into evidence of the
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at the
defendant's subsequent state criminal trial."' 1 2 At the defendant's
preliminary hearing, the defense called one witness'03 and ques-
tioned her in a manner that "clearly partook of cross-examina-
tion."' 0 The prosecution did not question the witness. 05
At trial, the State was unable to secure the witness' presence. 10 6
After the defendant testified, the State introduced a transcript of
the witness' preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal. 0 7 The de-
fendant objected to the use of the transcript and asserted that his
rights under the Confrontation Clause had been violated. 08 The
Supreme Court held that the preliminary hearing transcript bore
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be admissible at trial, 09 and
that the prosecution had met its burden of showing that the witness
was unavailable." 0 Therefore, the preliminary hearing transcript
was admissible.
En route to its decision, the Court stated that the Confrontation
Clause restricts the range of admissible hearsay in two ways: First,
the Clause establishes a rule of necessity which prefers face-to-
98. Id. at 216.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
101. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
102. Id. at 58.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. at 58.
106. Id. at 59. At a motion hearing, the witness' mother testified that she
had no knowledge of the witness' whereabouts and would be unable to reach
the witness in the case of an emergency. Id. at 60.
107. Id. at 59.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 73.
110. Id. at 75.
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face accusation by requiring the prosecution either to produce the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant,
or to demonstrate the unavailability of that declarant."' Second,
once the prosecution establishes that the witness is unavailable,
the prosecution must show, as a prerequisite to admissibility, that
the statement has "indicia of reliability,"1 2 which "can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception."" 3 Otherwise, evidence will be admissible
only if it is shown to have a "particularized guarantee of trust-
worthiness."114
These cases show that while the Confrontation Clause imposes
a rule of preference for live testimony over transcripts so that the
jury will be able to gauge credibility, former testimony is admissible
under certain guarded situations. Former testimony is admissible
upon a showing that the out-of-court declarant is unavailable and
that his previous sworn testimony was cross-examined by the
accused against whom the testimony is to be used." 5 "Unavaila-
bility" is more than being outside the portals of the courtroom." 6
Furthermore, "prior opportunity to cross-examine" requires more
than having been present when the former testimony was given." 7
Over the years, the Court has reaffirmed that the admission
of former testimony does not offend the Confrontation Clause."'
The explanation is obvious: with the safeguards of unavailability
and prior cross-examination, the accused retains the equivalence
of the protections provided by the Clause.1 9 The only Confron-
tation Clause protection arguably missing is the requirement that
the witness face the jury in person, a safeguard that the Mattox
Court described as being "an incidental benefit."' 20
111. Id. at 65.
112. Id. at 65-66 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
113. Id. at 66.
114. Id. (footnote omitted).
115. E.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 165-68.
116. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968).
117. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965). Of course, the party offering former testimony has the burden of
establishing all of the prerequisites. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 ("In the
usual case, . . . the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the una-
vailability of, the declarant . . ").
118. See Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
119. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
120. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
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While the previous testimony exception now broadly embraces
factual situations where the out-of-court declarant offers cross-
examined, sworn testimony of an earlier day, under the case law
this exception initially was permitted only in the extraordinary
circumstances of concealment and death.12 1 Those circumstances
prompted the Court to admit the statements and to find that there
was no violation of the Confrontation Clause even in view of the
purpose of the Clause. Noting that it was bound to interpret the
Clause within the legal framework that "existed at the time it was
adopted,"'' 2 the Mattox Court discussed the Clause's purpose:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in
question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits,
such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief.12 1
The Mattox Court then questioned whether the accused should
ever "lose the benefits of any of these safeguards, even by the
death of the witness."' 2 But these "general rules of law," stated
the Court, "must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case.''25
Since Mattox, the Court has expanded the reach of former
testimony to circumstances other than those involving concealment
or death of a witness, but the Court has maintained the unavail-
ability requirement. In Barber2 6 and Mancusi,127 for instance, the
121. In Reynolds, the government contended that it was unable to locate
the defendant's wife because the defendant had concealed her. 98 U.S. at 159-
60. In Mattox, the former testimony at issue was that of two witnesses who died
before the trial. 156 U.S. at 240.
122. 156 U.S. at 243.
123. Id. at 242-43.
124. Id. at 243.
125. Id.
126. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
127. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
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Court elaborated upon the state's good faith obligation to produce
available prosecution witnesses and emphasized the state's affir-
mative duty to exert reasonable efforts to locate the witnesses. 28
Hence, although the unavailability requirement for former testi-
mony had its beginnings in circumstances involving the concealment
or death of a witness, that requirement has been expanded to
embrace other situations where the offering party has made a good
faith effort to locate the witness, but cannot because of circum-
stances beyond the party's control.
Ohio v. Roberts'29 travels in the same direction as its prede-
cessor former testimony cases relative to unavailability. Roberts
dealt with a witness' former testimony given at a preliminary
hearing. 130 In holding that the state had shown unavailability where
the state was unable to locate the witness, the Court merely
reaffirmed the unavailability requirement. The true significance of
Roberts is that its approach to reconciling the Confrontation Clause
and the rules of hearsay appears to extend the unavailability
requirement beyond just former testimony.
Nevertheless, from Reynolds to Roberts, from 1878 to 1980,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the former testimony
exception to the hearsay rule does not violate the Confrontation
Clause. The former testimony exception requires oath, unavaila-
bility and opportunity for prior cross-examination, and is now an
accepted feature of criminal procedure law.
3. Co-Conspirator Statements
The line of cases involving co-conspirator statements represents
the third category of hearsay exceptions that the Court has rec-
onciled with the Confrontation Clause. The three leading cases
dealing with this topic are Dutton v. Evans," United States v.
Inadi,132 and Bourjaily v. United States.33 Dutton held that the
128. In Barber, where the witness was incarcerated in a federal prison in
another state, and where under case law and state evidence law this amounted
to unavailability, the Court held that those facts alone were not sufficient to
meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 390 U.S. at 721-25. In
Mancusi, the Court agreed that the witness was unavailable under the Confron-
tation Clause only because the witness had become a permanent resident of
Sweden and the State of Tennessee was powerless to secure the witness' presence
at trial. 408 U.S. at 211-13.
129. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
130. Id. at 58.
131. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
132. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
133. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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statement of the defendant's co-conspirator was admissible and
not violative of the Confrontation Clause. The Court reasoned
that a spontaneous statement adverse to the witness' penal interest
has indicia of reliability and that the admission of the statement
does not deny a defendant's right of confrontation if the witness
is cross-examined. 3 4 Inadi proclaimed that the co-conspirator ex-
ception was not circumscribed by a showing of unavailability.'35
Then, Bourjaily announced that evidence admitted under this
exception was not dependent upon a showing of indicia of relia-
bility. 3 6 Collectively, the cases show the co-conspirator exception
is compatible with the Confrontation Clause and, further, that the
requirements of unavailability and indicia of reliability championed
by Roberts do not apply to the co-conspirator hearsay exception.
In Dutton v. Evans, 37 a murder case, Evans, Williams and
Truett were charged with brutally killing a police officer. In return
for his testimony, Truett was granted immunity from prosecution,
and Evans and Williams were indicted. 38 At Evans' separate trial,
the prosecution called twenty witnesses.139 When one witness, Shaw,
testified, defense counsel objected, contending that Evans' right
of confrontation had been violated. 4' After the objection was
overruled, Shaw testified that Williams, the alleged co-conspirator,
had previously stated, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-
bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now.' 1 1 The Court held
that since the statement had been admitted as a co-conspirator's
statement, it did not violate the Confrontation Clause in the
circumstances of the case."42 The Court observed, "It seems ap-
parent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the
evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But, this Court
has never equated the two . .. ."41
In United States v. Inadi, 44 a jury convicted Inadi of conspiring
to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance and other
related offenses. 14 The evidence introduced at trial showed that
134. 400 U.S. at 89.
135. 475 U.S. at 399-400.
136. 483 U.S. at 182.
137. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
138. Id. at 76.
139. Id. at 77.
140. Id. at 77-78.
141. Id. at 77.
142. Id. at 87-88.
143. Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted).
144. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
145. Id. at 388-89.
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Inadi and other co-conspirators were involved in manufacturing
and selling methamphetamine. 14 At trial, the Government played
taped telephone conversations between the various participants of
the conspiracy. The tapes included statements made by non-testi-
fying, unindicted co-conspirators and showed their involvement in
the conspiracy. Inadi objected to the admission of the recorded
statements, arguing that they did not satisfy the requirements of
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).' 47 Inadi also contended that, absent a
showing that the declarants were unavailable, the admission of
their statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him.148 The Third Circuit reversed the con-
viction on the ground that "the Confrontation Clause established
an independent requirement that the Government, as a condition
to the admission of any out-of-court statements, must show the
unavailability of the declarant."' 49
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the admission of co-
conspirators' statements which otherwise satisfy the requirements
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), does not violate the
Confrontation Clause. Further, it found that a showing of the
declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to the statements' ad-
missibility is not required. 50 The Court's reasons for refusing to
extend the unavailability rule to co-conspirator's statements were:
(1) that co-conspirator statements made while the conspiracy is in
progress "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot
be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in
court,' 5' because the statements derive their significance from the
circumstances in which they are made, and (2) that the contextual
significance of the statements is further shown in that the co-
conspirators' positions will have changed significantly between the
time of making the statements and the time of trial. 52 The Court
pointed out that an unavailability rule would have no benefit in
146. Id. at 389.
147. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "A statement is not hearsay if ... the
statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R.
Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
148. 475 U.S. at 390.
149. Id. at 391.
150. Id. at 400.
151. Id. at 395.
152. Id.
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this context unless the prosecution mistakenly failed to introduce
an available witness, because in all other circumstances the testi-
mony would be admitted either because the declarant testified as
a witness, or is "unavailable.' 5 3 The Court also noted that an
unavailability rule is not likely to add anything to the "truth-
determining process." 154 Further, an unavailability rule would im-
pose significant burdens on the prosecution in locating witnesses
and then ensuring their availability for trial.1 55
In Bourjaily v. United States,5 6 the defendant was convicted
of federal drug charges, including a conspiracy count. The evidence
showed that a co-conspirator, Lonardo, had spoken earlier with
an informant about a cocaine transaction. 157 During the course of
the tape-recorded conversation, Lonardo spoke about his alleged
partner, who turned out to be the defendant. Later, Lonardo and
the defendant were arrested while buying cocaine from the inform-
ant. 15 At trial, the court admitted Lonardo's statements to the
informant. The lower court found that the proof showed that a
conspiracy did exist, and that the statements in question were made
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 5 9 The defendant objected to the
admission of the statements, contending that he could not cross-
examine Lonardo because Lonardo had elected not to testify.:6
Affirming the rulings of the trial court and the court of appeals,the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was violated and held that the
Government was not required to show "independent indicia of
reliability" to satisfy the Confrontation Clause in this case.16'
4. Summary of Precedent
In summary, the precedent to White shows that the Court did
not view all hearsay evidence as repugnant to the Confrontation
Clause. Nor did it accept all hearsay evidence as compatible with
the Clause. Rather, the Court recognized only three hearsay ex-
153. Id. at 396.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 399.
156. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
157. Id. at 173.
158. Id. at 174.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 182.
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ceptions cognizable under the Confrontation Clause: dying decla-
rations, former testimony, and co-conspirator statements. The
Court was satisfied that each of these exceptions was grounded in
reliability. Further, in view of the peculiarities of the basis for the
co-conspirator statement exceptions, the Court did not require a
showing of unavailability for its use at trial. However, the Court
did require such a showing for the use of former testimony. The
Court in White could have stayed this course, or as suggested in
Roberts, could have required all hearsay exceptions to satisfy the
requirements of unavailability and indicia of reliability. But the
Court chose not to travel in either of these directions; instead, the
White Court broke new ground.
III. THE WHITE DEcIsIoN
A. The Majority Opinion
In White v. Illinois,162 the defendant was convicted by a jury
of the aggravated criminal sexual assault of a four-year-old girl
and other offenses. 163 The child did not testify at trial. Without
finding that the child was unavailable to testify,' 64 and over the
defense's objection, the trial court allowed testimony from five
witnesses under the "spontaneous declaration" and "medical ex-
amination" exceptions to the hearsay rule. 65 The gist of the
victim's statements, as presented at trial by the five witnesses, was
that the "[defendant] had put his hand over her mouth, choked
her, threatened to whip her if she screamed and had 'touch[ed]
her in the wrong places." ' "66 The five witnesses who testified were
the victim's mother, the baby-sitter, the first responding police
officer, a hospital nurse, and an emergency room physician. 67 The
police officer testified that the child victim also told him that the
defendant had engaged her private parts with his tongue. 68 The
Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the testimony and
observed that the victim's statements to all of the witnesses were
"essentially identical.' 69
162. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
163. Id. at 739.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 739-40.
166. Id. at 739.
167. Id. at 739-40.
168. Id. at 739.
169. Id.
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The defendant contended that, under the Confrontation Clause,
either the child witness should have been produced at trial by the
prosecution, or the trial court should have made a finding that
the child was unavailable to testify.170 The Supreme Court disagreed
with this view and stated that the protection afforded by the
Confrontation Clause is not so expansive as to require unavaila-
bility for the admission of all out-of-court statements.'
7
'
The Court also declined to read the Confrontation Clause so
narrowly as to "virtually eliminate its role in restricting the ad-
mission of hearsay testimony.' ' 72 Rather, the Court sought to
"stee[r] a middle course,"' 73 and concluded that "hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values"' 74 and that both "stem from the same roots."'' 75
Hence, the Court ruled that "where proffered hearsay has suffi-
cient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satis-
fied.' 76 What the Court failed to consider is that "[c]onfrontation,
however, is more than a direct guarantee of reliability, it incor-
porates an element of fairness, of affording the defendant an
opportunity to test evidence against him, no matter how reliable
that evidence may seem."'' 77
Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded by its earlier ruling
in Ohio v. Roberts'78 that "the Confrontation Clause generally
requires that a declarant either be produced at trial or be found
unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted into
evidence.' ' 79 In Roberts, the Court ruled against the defendant's
challenge under the Confrontation Clause to the prosecution's
introduction at trial of a transcript of the testimony of a witness
170. Id. at 740.
171. Id. at 741-42. Seeking to define unavailability, the White Court stated,
"[b]y 'unavailability rule,' we mean a rule which would require as a predicate
for introducing hearsay testimony either a showing of the declarant's unavailability
or production at trial of the declarant." Id. at 742 n.6.
172. Id. at 741. The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that the Clause
should bar only the use of hearsay statements that are "in the character of an
ex parte affidavit." Id. at 741. However, the Court found that, in view of
precedent, this argument came "too late in the day." Id.
173. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980)).
174. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)).
175. Id. (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
176. Id. at 743.
177. Note, supra note 10, at 940.
178. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
179. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741.
1993]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
who had not appeared at trial, but who at a probable cause hearing
had been questioned by defense counsel.1 80 In rejecting the defen-
dant's claim, the Roberts Court explained the function of the
Confrontation Clause:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways
to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in con-
formance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face
accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of
necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior
cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must ei-
ther produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the
defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to
be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to aug-
ment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the
Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trust-
worthiness that "there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule."''
However, the White Court stated that the above language must
be reconciled with the Court's holding in United States v. Inadi,82
where it addressed the admissibility of out-of-court statements
made by a co-conspirator during the course of the conspiracy. 8 1
In Inadi, the Court limited Roberts to its facts by refusing to
interpret Roberts as imposing an unavailability requirement for
use of all out-of-court statements. 84 Hence, the White Court
refused to extend the unavailability requirement as pronounced in
Roberts, and instead held that "Roberts stands for the proposition
that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding."'8 5
The White Court explained that its holding in Inadi was based
on two factors:
180. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
181. Id. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
182. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741 (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986)).
183. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 388.
184. Id. at 394.
185. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741.
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First, unlike former in-court testimony, co-conspirator
statements "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context
that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to
the same matters in court ... .
Second, we observed that there is little benefit, if any,
to be accomplished by imposing an "unavailability rule".
Such a rule will not work to bar absolutely the introduction
of the out-of-court statements; if the declarant either is
unavailable, or is available and produced for trial, the
statements can be introduced. 86
In addition, the White Court was concerned that "while an una-
vailability rule would therefore do little to improve the accuracy
of factfinding, it is likely to impose substantial additional burdens
on the fact finding process."'187
The White Court held that the above observations "apply with
full force to the case at hand."' 18 8 Hence, as in Inadi, the Court
was persuaded that the hearsay statements at issue were "made in
contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthi-
ness." 189 In summary, the Court expounded:
We therefore think it clear that the out-of-court state-
ments admitted in this case had substantial probative value,
value that could not be duplicated simply by the declarant
later testifying in court. To exclude such probative state-
ments under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause
would be the height of wrong-headedness, given that the
Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion
of the "integrity of the fact-finding process." . . . And as
we have also noted, a statement that qualifies for admission
under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception is so trustworthy
that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its
reliability .... Given the evidentiary value of such state-
ments, their reliability, and that establishing a generally
applicable unavailability rule would have few practicai ben-
efits while imposing pointless litigation costs, we see no
reason to treat the out-of-court statements in this case
186. Id. at 742 (quoting Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96) (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 742.
188. Id.
189. Id. (footnote omitted).
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differently from those we found admissible in Inadi. A
contrary rule would result in exactly the kind of "wholesale
revision" of the laws of evidence that we expressly disa-
vowed in Inadi. We therefore see no basis in Roberts or
Inadi for excluding from trial, under the aegis of the
Confrontation Clause, evidence embraced within such ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule as those for spontaneous dec-
larations and statements made for medical treatment. 19
The above pronouncements are inconsistent with the Court's
prior decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause in a manner
which indeed causes friction between it and the hearsay rules of
evidence. While this point was not discussed in the majority
opinion, it was examined in Justice Thomas' separate concurring
opinion, which was joined by Justice Scalia.' 9 1
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote separately "only to suggest that our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that
is perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause
itself.' '192 He further stated:
The Court unnecessarily rejects, in dicta, the United States'
suggestion that the Confrontation Clause in general may
not regulate the admission of hearsay evidence .... The
truth may be that this Court's cases unnecessarily have
complicated and confused the relationship between the con-
stitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of
evidence.
The Confrontation Clause provides simply that "[imn all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." It
is plain that the critical phrase within the clause for pur-
poses of this case is "witnesses against him." Any attempt
at unraveling and understanding the relationship between
the Clause and the hearsay rules must begin with an analysis
of the meaning of that phrase. Unfortunately, in recent
cases in this area, the Court has assumed that all hearsay
190. Id. at 743 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988), which
quoted Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)) (other citations omitted).
191. Id. at 744-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 744.
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declarants are "witnesses against" a defendant within the
meaning of the Clause, ... an assumption that is neither
warranted nor supported by the history or the text of the
Confrontation Clause. 93
Determined to develop an interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause which would be true to its text and history, as well as
congruent with the Court's earlier cases, Justice Thomas reached
several conclusions vital to his interpretation of the Clause. First,
he noted that "[tihere is virtually no evidence of what the drafters
of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean."' 194 Hence, courts
were given little guidance as to how to interpret the phrase "wit-
nesses against him." Justice Thomas then discussed the Wigmore-
Harlan interpretation, which construes the phrase to mean that
under the Confrontation Clause a defendant has the right to
confront and cross-examine only those witnesses who actually
appear and testify at trial. 195 Justice Thomas rejected this inter-
pretation because it creates tension with exceptions recognized at
common law and with the Court's precedent. 9
Justice Thomas also discussed an interpretation suggested by
the United States as amicus curiae. This approach would apply
the Confrontation Clause "only to those persons who provide in-
court testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits,
depositions, or confessions that are made in contemplation of legal
proceedings."' 97 Justice Thomas observed:
This interpretation is in some ways more consistent with
the text and history of the Clause than our current juris-
prudence, and it is largely consistent with our cases. If not
carefully formulated, however, this approach might be dif-
ficult to apply, and might develop in a manner not entirely
consistent with the crucial "witnesses against him" phrase. 9
Relative to the interaction between the Confrontation Clause
and the rules of evidence, Justice Thomas stated:
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. Id. (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 n.8 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Baker, supra note 8, at 532).
195. Id. (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J. concurring); 5 WiGMoRE,
supra note 10, § 1397).
196. Id. at 745.
197. Id. at 747.
198. Id.
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There appears to be little if any indication in the historical
record that the exceptions to the hearsay rule were under-
stood to be limited by the simultaneously evolving common-
law right of confrontation. The Court has never explored
the historical evidence on this point. As a matter of plain
language, however, it is difficult to see how or why the
Clause should apply to hearsay evidence as a general prop-
osition. 199
Finally, Justice Thomas offered his interpretation of the Con-
frontation Clause. His formulation presumably would be loyal to
its text and history, workable within the realm of rules of hearsay
evidence, and respectful of the Court's prior cases interpreting the
Clause. 2°° According to Justice Thomas: "The federal constitu-
tional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually
testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions.' '201
C. Analysis
The holding in White is troubling. The key witness whose
words sealed the defendant's fate never had to appear in court
and allow herself to be tested by cross-examination. Although
White involved the sexual abuse of a four-year-old, one must be
careful not to be over-influenced by the sensitivities of the case.
Surely, the reader abhors sexual abuse. Any compassionate soul
leaps to spare a toddler from public interrogation by an insensitive,
zealous defense attorney. Many might be inclined to dispense with
any need for cross-examining a mere infant deemed too young to
form the intent to lie. If the evidence overwhelmingly points to
the defendant's guilt, some might be less inclined to critically
review this matter.20 2 Others might point to the fact that the
defendant made no attempt to call the child victim as a witness.
199. Id. at 746 (footnote omitted).
200. Id. at 747.
201. Id.
202. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) ("[The focus
of the Confrontation Clause is on individual witnesses. Accordingly, the focus
of the prejudice inquiry in determining whether the confrontation right has been
violated must be on the particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire
trial.").
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Of course, those beguiled by that view would have lost sight of
the government's burden at trial to convict by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt an accused who has no duty to present any
evidence.203
These sensitivities mask the larger concern. First, White is not
restricted just to child-abuse cases. Thus, it should not be construed
simply as one more case in the child-protective mode of Coy v.
Iowa204 and Maryland v. Craig.2 5 While the holding of White
arose in the context of such a case, nothing in the holding confines
it only to child-abuse cases. The jurisprudence expounded in White
is applicable to all criminal cases.
Next, one should not lose sight of the seriousness of this
matter. A defendant's reputation, livelihood, and freedom are at
stake. The law has long preached that one exposed to the dread-
noughts of a criminal felony conviction, with all of its attendant
penalties, must be accorded every constitutional protection. The
oft-cited maxim of "it is better that ten guilty men go free, than
one innocent man be convicted" appropriately summarizes the
point.20
Suppose that in White the victim had fabricated the story.
Suppose that she was a precocious four-year-old, influenced by
something on television, or by the remarks of adults. Suppose that
her scream and subsequent outcry were the product of a dream.
The facts of the incident as reported by the United States Supreme
Court were that the child's statements to the five witnesses who
203. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) ("The requirement that guilt
of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at
least from our early years as a Nation.").
204. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The Court found a violation of the defendant's
right to face his accuser when pursuant to a state statute the trial court had
allowed two sexually-assaulted, thirteen-year-old girls to testify behind a large
screen placed between them and the defendant on trial, even though the trial
court never made any findings that these particular witnesses needed special
protection.
205. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). The Court reiterated the Confrontation Clause's
guarantee of face-to-face confrontation, but found no violation of the Clause.
Similar to Coy, the six-year-old victim of child abuse testified at trial via closed
circuit television. Pursuant to a state statute, the trial court determined that the
procedure was necessary for the welfare of the child. Id. at 857.
206. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 27
(1765) (The ancient criminal law maxim is that "it is better that ten guilty persons
escape, than one innocent suffer.").
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testified at trial were "essentially the same. ' 20 7 However, the facts
as recounted by the Court also state that the child told her story
to her sitter, her mother, and then to Officer Terry Lewis. To
Officer Lewis, she seemingly added a statement, that the defendant
"used his tongue on her in her private parts. ' 20 8 If the victim were
an adult offering an enlarged account of an event which had
occurred forty-five minutes earlier and already had been reported
to two other persons, one might suspect embellishment. How,
outside of cross-examination, could these matters be explored? 2°9
But instead of being able to test the credibility of the child victim,
the defendant was permitted only to confront witnesses likely to
be partial to the child.
210
Consequently, in the wake of White, the state may succeed in
securing the conviction of an accused upon evidence submitted by
available declarants who never appear in person at trial to subject
themselves to cross-examination. 21' This is a revolting development
which causes unsettling ripples to wash upon other aspects of
Constitutional jurisprudence.
First, White virtually eviscerates the Confrontation Clause,
consigning its corpse to burial in the hearsay rules of evidence.
Before White, the Court was careful not to join the Confrontation
Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule. 212 More than once, the
207. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739.
208. Id.
209. See generally David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About
Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility
of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRam. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1 (1986) (a
thorough discussion of the problems associated with the admissibility of expert
testimony offered to vouch for the credibility of a child witness). Professor
McCord states, "inhere are only two major issues in a child sexual abuse case:
has the child been sexually abused? and was the abuse perpetrated by the
defendant?" Id. at 40.
210. 112 S. Ct. at 739-40.
211. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confron-
tation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L.
REv. 557 (1992). I do not share Professor Berger's overwhelming concern re-
garding prosecutorial abuse; however, I agree that there must be necessary
restraints on the admission of hearsay, if the Sixth Amendment right of con-
frontation is to have meaning.
212. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970):
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause are generally designed to" protect similar values, it is quite
a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence;
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Court proclaimed that while the two grew from the same roots,
they were not of the same tree. 23 But, White has now grafted
these limbs together: "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guar-
antees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. ' 214 As such,
evidence law now defines the contours of the Confrontation Clause:
hearsay definitions now shape the Clause. 215 The White Court has
pried the top off the evidentiary rules of hearsay, and dumped
into its body the dictates of the Confrontation Clause.
In so doing, in spite of its protestations to the contrary, the
White Court has managed to constitutionalize the hearsay rules by
incorporating the Confrontation Clause into them. As a result, the
hearsay rules have been elevated to constitutional magnitude with-
out benefit of the legislative process and the constitutional stature
of the Confrontation Clause has been sapped of vitality.
While the White Court grafted the Confrontation Clause onto
the hearsay rules, the Court did so in disregard of some of its
own previous observations. In Roberts, the Court stated that "[t]he
historical evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the Clause
was intended to exclude some hearsay. ' 216 Yet, the White Court
has allowed "firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule to
override the Confrontation Clause. 217 If "firmly rooted" exceptions
are those dating back to the birth of the Clause, then what hearsay
was the Roberts Court discussing?
In addition to its disquieting uplifting of the hearsay rules to
constitutional stature, the White decision has another disturbing
aspect. Because the Court has essentially determined that the
Confrontation Clause only guarantees a defendant the right to
cross-examine the witnesses who appear at trial, the purpose of
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation
values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an
arguably recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true:
merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established
hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
rights have been denied.
Id. at 155-56 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (footnotes omitted) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from
the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do
so now.").
213. See Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56; Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86.
214. 112 S. Ct. at 743.
215. See Jonakait, supra note 38.
216. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
217. 112 S. Ct. at 743.
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the Clause, to bar trials by ex parte affidavit, will be difficult to
accomplish. Under White, an accused may be convicted by docu-
mentary evidence or other hearsay evidence of a declarant whose
presence at trial is excused by "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.
While the White Court drove the last nail into the interpretation
of the Clause which occasioned this result, the hammering clearly
began some time ago. In Mattox, the Court saw the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause as providing the accused with the op-
portunity to examine the witness before a jury capable of assessing
the credibility of the witness.2 1 In Kirby v. United States219 and
in Dowdell v. United States,220 for instance, the Court repeated
this theme, which was then carried through other cases. 22 Then,
in Dutton v. Evans, 2 the Court shifted gears and declared that
the "mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in crim-
inal trials .... "22 Now, White has taken "practical concerns"
to a new height, one so lofty that those concerns have overpowered
the salutary purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Although the
Confrontation Clause was intended to bar trial by ex parte affi-
davit, 224 the White Court allows that result because the accused
may be convicted solely on documentary evidence admissible as
hearsay exceptions under business records"5 or public records. 226
Hence, the Court has come full circle.
218. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
219. 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
220. 221 U.S. 325 (1911). In Dowdell, the Court stated:
This [Philippine statute] is substantially the provision of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides
that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This provision of the
statute intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as
facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.
It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions
or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right
of cross-examination.
Id. at 329-30.
221. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
222. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
223. Id. at 89.
224. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
225. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides that the following is not
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The Court has completed this circle in spite of the language
of the Clause itself. The Clause guarantees to an accused the right
to confront and cross-examine the "witnesses against him" not
merely the evidence against him.227 Even if the Confrontation
Clause was expected to accommodate some hearsay,22s the White
Court goes too far in concluding that all of the hearsay exceptions
are equally embraced.
IV. ALTERNATIV CONSTRUCTIONS
Dissatisfied with both the practical and jurisprudential promises
of White, I now reach for a construction of the Confrontation
Clause that would be true to its purpose, yet accommodate the
times. The White Court was overwhelmed with the perceived
dilemma of how to reconcile the Confrontation Clause with the
hearsay rule.229 To hold that the Clause requires the in-court
presence of all witnesses against the accused would seem to con-
demn the prosecution to a most difficult standard. The prosecution
would be forced to locate and hold for trial all witnesses, even
minor ones. Trials would be lengthened, and societal costs would
escalate. Similar results would attend a ruling endorsing the una-
vailability rule. Furthermore, the White Court was convinced that
these considerations would pose problems for the hearsay rule. As
the Court observed, the above alternatives would "result in ...
'wholesale revision' of the laws of evidence.' 230 Thus, faced with
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. Evw. 803(6).
226. See FED. R. Evn,. 803(8). For a discussion of the admission of business
and official records, see Note, supra note 10, at 943-45. See also Paul C.
Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REv.
45, 83 (1993).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... "
228. HELLER, supra note 13, at 105 n.6.
229. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992).
230. Id. at 743 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986)).
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these concerns, the White Court resolved to dismantle the Con-
frontation Clause, constitutionalize the hearsay rule, and spare
society the additional costs and burdens of prosecution. Conspic-
uously missing from these considerations is fairness to the accused.
A. Justice Thomas' Construction
In seeking to fashion a better construction, I will first consider
that which was suggested by Justice Thomas in his concurring
opinion in White.23 Justice Thomas' solution is to read the Con-
frontation Clause as applying only to those persons who actually
testify at trial. 2 His construction, like that of the majority, would
permit the use at trial of all hearsay evidence that falls within a
hearsay exception unless the hearsay is contained in affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 233 This formulation
provides little sustenance for one already starved by the White
opinion. Justice Thomas' approach still leaves open the possibility
of convictions obtained solely by non-testifying, unavailable de-
clarants. While Justice Thomas addresses only certain documentary
evidence, he loses sight of the Clause's broader purpose: to require
confrontation and cross-examination of all witnesses. Given the
shortcomings of Justice Thomas' formulation, others must be
considered.
B. Literalism
A formulation rejected repeatedly by the Court is one endorsing
a rigid, literal reading of the Clause. 2 4 Under this view, the Court
would require the presence in court of every witness poised to
testify against the accused. This approach imposes increased soci-
etal costs, greater prosecution burdens, and virtually eradicates the
hearsay exceptions. 235 Actually, hearsay arguably could survive and
be presented at trial, but only if the declarant eventually testified
at trial.
Constitutional scholars waiting to pounce on the "literal mean-
ing" approach would be quick to point out that, supposedly, when
the Clause was written, some hearsay exceptions enjoyed wide-
231. Id. at 747 (Thomas, J., concurring).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970).
235. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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spread approval. 236 This, say these critics, shows that the Clause
was expected to accommodate some hearsay. However, because
the history of the Confrontation Clause is not written on a clean
slate, and because the language of the Clause supports a literal
reading, one could conclude that the Framers wished to signal the
deathknell of all the hearsay exceptions.
While this "literal" approach would occasion a temporary
overhaul of the judicial system, in the long run it probably would
result in the constitutionalization of the hearsay rule. Eventually,
society would tire of the burdens imposed by a literal reading of
the Clause and either reinterpret the Clause, or constitutionalize
the hearsay rule. Because such an approach has little chance of
adoption, another formulation must be considered.
C. Pre-White Trilogy-The Case Exceptions
Another construction, perfectly faithful to the case law, would
allow exceptions to the prosecution's duty to produce the actual
witness in court only if the testimony is presented through dying
declarations, former testimony, and statements of co-conspira-
tors. 2317 Until White, these were the only exceptions to the hearsay
236. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; HELLER, supra note 13, at 105 n.6; 5
WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1397.
237. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243, recognizes the dying declaration exception.
Other cases make the point that former testimony is admissible when the out-of-
court declarant is unavailable but was sworn and cross-examined by the accused
at an earlier time. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (in a case where
the defendant kept the witness away from the present trial, the Court noted:
"The accused was present at the time the [prior] testimony was given, and had
full opportunity of cross-examination. This brings the case clearly within the
well-established rules."). In Motes, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), the Court found a
violation of the Confrontation Clause where the witness who gave the prior
testimony was absent "manifestly due to the negligence of the officers of the
Government." Id. at 478. This was so even though the witness had been cross-
examined by the defendant's counsel at the preliminary hearing at which he gave
the testimony. See id. at 468. However, in dictum, the Court went on to note
that the case would have turned out differently had the witness been absent "by
the procurement or with the assent of . . . the accused." Id. at 474.
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court, in commenting on a
witness who had subsequently moved to another state, noted that "[t]he case
before us would be quite a different one had [the witness'] statement been taken
at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who
had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross examine." Id. at
407. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968), the Court ruled that the
prosecution needs to show a good-faith effort to obtain the presence of a witness
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rule that the Court had reconciled with the Confrontation Clause.
An argument can be made for limiting the hearsay exception under
the Clause to those three exceptions. First, they are the only
exceptions sanctioned by pre-White case law. Secondly, assuming
that the Clause was expected to accommodate some hearsay, these
are logical candidates. According to one scholar, the dying dec-
laration was the only extant exception to the hearsay rule when
the Clause was ratified. 2 8 During that bygone era, it was widely
believed that a deathbed witness, aware of his imminent demise,
would be of the condition "that every motive to falsehood must
be supposed to have been silenced, and the mind to be impelled
by the most powerful considerations to tell the truth.' '239
The former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, likewise
is not offensive to the Confrontation Clause because the accused
confronted the witness and had an opportunity for cross-exami-
nation at a prior judicial proceeding. Further, the requirement of
unavailability, which case law reads into this exception, provides
an additional safeguard because only necessary hearsay will be
admitted.m
Finally, the co-conspirator exception may be explained under
the conspiracy law rationale.241 At common law, all members of a
conspiracy were deemed to be partners in crime authorized to
speak for each other. Accordingly, under this classical agency
rationale, the acts of one were the acts of all and the statements
of one were the statements of all.242 As a threshold matter, once
at trial. See also Green v. California, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (prior testimony of
present witness admissible because it was "given under circumstances closely
approximating those that surround the typical trial."); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 209-16 (1972). Finally, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), United
States v Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), and Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987), certify the admissibility of a co-conspirator's statement made in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
238. HELLER, supra note 13, at 105 n.6.
239. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (citing Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892)).
240. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
241. See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1827) (the first case
in which the Supreme Court articulated the co-conspirator exception).
242. See 4 JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERoER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §
801(d)(2)(E)(01) (1991) (citing Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926)). The authors refer the reader to the
following passage for the classical agency rationale:
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of law of evidence,
but of the substantive law of crime. When men enter into an agreement
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the offering party had established that a conspiracy existed, that
the offered statement was made during the course of the conspir-
acy, that the declarant was a participant in the conspiracy, and
that the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy, the
offered declaration was admissible and competent proof against
other co-conspirators. 243 Hence, construed as an authorized state-
ment by the accused, a co-conspirator declaration would not collide
with the dictates of the Confrontation Clause.24
Under the "case exceptions" approach, the Confrontation
Clause would tolerate only the above three exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Because pre-White case law has already recognized
these three exceptions and because many constitutional scholars
contend that the Confrontation Clause was expected to accom-
modate some hearsay, there is authority for this approach. How-
ever, its shortcoming is obvious. This approach would not
countenance the holding in White. Other hearsay exceptions, such
as excited utterances, business records, and public records, would
simply be cast into oblivion, unless the out-of-court declarant
eventually testified.
D. Non-Substantive Hearsay Approach
An approach which would not do great violence to the hearsay
rule, but still would serve the ends of the Confrontation Clause,
is a "non-substantive hearsay rule" approach. A non-substantive
hearsay rule would allow the prosecution to use the hearsay
exceptions as warranted, except to make out a prima facie case
capable of surviving a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter
of lawY 5 Thus, under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecuting
for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and
have made "a partnership in crime." What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such acts, they
are competent against all.
Id. (quoting Van Riper, 13 F.2d at 967).
243. See PAuL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RuLES OF
EVIDENCE 474-95 (2d ed. 1990).
244. At present, this exception is provided in Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E): "A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against
a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
245. See generally Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the
Hearsay Rule and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REv. 151 (1978) (applying
the confrontation clause to devastating or crucial evidence and requiring the state
to produce the witness when the witness' statement is accusatory).
19931
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
attorney would be compelled to call live witnesses vital to estab-
lishing the essential elements of the charged offense. 246 Hearsay
elicited during the trial would be deemed non-substantive relative
to the elements of the offense. As such, any elicited, admitted
hearsay merely would corroborate or impeach other evidence.247
Hence, the accused would be accorded the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses necessary to establish the government's
prima facie case, and the prosecuting attorney and accused still
would be able to utilize hearsay exceptions.
E. The Preferred Alternative
The final and preferred approach is that championed by Rob-
erts.2s Roberts strikes a reasoned balance between the approaches
of literalism and White, in harmony with that of the pre-White
cases, while furthering at least the spirit of the Confrontation
Clause's intent. Roberts ruled that the Confrontation Clause re-
stricts the range of admissible hearsay by requiring unavailability
and indicia of reliability. 249 These two requirements, unavailability
and indicia of reliability, taken together constitute a sound ap-
proach which is consistent with the aims of the Confrontation
Clause. 250 The White Court's reasons were twofold: First, requiring
the out-of-court declarant to appear and testify does not promise
to convey the significance of the statement because it is not possible
to replicate the context in which the declarant made the statement.
Secondly, the unavailability rule poses far more problems than
benefits.25' However, the Court's reasoning appears rooted more
in convenience than in concern for the accused who wishes to
cross-examine the accuser. The Court is blind to the increasing
246. See generally Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRrM. L. BULL.
99 (1972) (defining "witnesses against" as "principal witnesses" for the prose-
cution whose statements are "crucial").
247. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (introduction of an
accomplice's confession for rebuttal purposes does not violate the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause).
248. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
249. Id. at 65-66.
250. See Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and
Reliability for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 189 (1993).
251. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992). The Court adopted the
Inadi standard for the admission of hearsay used under the "spontaneous
declaration" and "statements made for medical treatment" exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986).
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number of convictions which will be secured primarily upon hear-
say testimony. Unbound by any "unavailability requirement,"
some prosecutors will deliberately choose to present hearsay evi-
dence through an honest, credible in-court declarant, instead of
chancing a conviction on the testimony of the actual declarant,
who is less credible and more susceptible to cross-examination. 252
The hapless accused will not be able to explore adequately the
accused's motive, powers of discernment, angle of observation, or
intelligence. 2 3 Instead, the accused will be confronted with the
more credible messenger whose words may spell doom to the
accused.
Nor is it a satisfactory answer that the accused may call the
witness to testify. 2 4 First, it would result in the jury hearing the
damaging testimony twice-a circumstance certain to prejudice the
accused. Second, it would conflict with the accused's presumption
of innocence and the state's burden of proof. By allowing the
state to use hearsay, when the out-of-court declarant is available,
the Court places the accused in a predicament: the accused may
either suffer a conviction based on insufficiently cross-examined
(or noncross-examined) testimony, or call the witness who is sure
to give damaging testimony.
Imagine the dilemma of the accused in White. The youthful
victim did not testify. Should the accused call her and chance a
repeat account of her version of the facts? Should the accused
call her and risk further jury sympathy for the child when they
see her? Can he risk her tears or her innocence? The jury under-
stands that to prove its case the state is required to call the victim,
and that the accused, no matter how despicable, is permitted to
cross-examine. 25 But will the jury be equally understanding when
the accused calls the victim as a witness during his case-in-chief?
The White rule opens a door to the prosecution which, in time,
will impact adversely upon the accused's right at trial to stand
mute and require the state to prove its case against him.
252. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1438-39.
253. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics,
9 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 183 (1985). Professor Imwinkelried demonstrates how
"[c]ross-examination plays a crucial role in eliciting unfavorable demeanor by
witnesses." Id. at 217.
254. But see Anthony C. Porcelli, Note, Sixth Amendment-Right to Con-
front One's Accuser When the Victim Does Not Testify, 83 J. CmiU. L. &
CRINOLOGY 868, 892-93 (1993).
255. See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform:
Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REv. 623 (1992).
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The White Court, in moving away from an "unavailability"
rule was also myopic to the actual reliability of hearsay. Reading
White, one may be persuaded that the "firmly rooted" exceptions
to the hearsay rule indeed are reservoirs of "reliability." Appar-
ently, the Court is convinced that the "firmly rooted" exceptions
possess an "indicia of reliability" based upon the rationale for
the exception and its age.256 This trust in the reliability of the
hearsay exceptions is simply overbroad. Consider the excited ut-
terance exception. Just because a person made a statement in
excitement does not mean that the out-of-court declarant could
accurately visualize, perceive and describe the event in question.257
Likewise just because an entry appears in a business record does
not mean that the out-of-court declarant had no reason to falsify
the record. The White Court seems to have forgotten the short-
comings of hearsay evidence. Instead, the Court raises hearsay
evidence to constitutional stature and unleashes it unchecked on
the accused in criminal trials.
The White Court's emphasis on problems for the criminal
justice system is similarly shortsighted. The Court mentions the
problems of finding and holding witnesses and of scheduling
"unavailability" hearings.25 1 Surely, similar concerns for a prolif-
eration of hearings were raised when the Court began requiring
Miranda warnings 259 or Fourth Amendment suppression hearings. 260
Surely, similar concerns regarding locating and holding witnesses
were raised when the Court required in-court witnesses to provide
proof on the chain-of-evidence. An "unavailability" hearing would
be quite simple in comparison to a Miranda hearing or a Fourth
Amendment suppression hearing. The Court only needs to provide
clear guidelines for the lower courts to decide the issue. 261 Although
256. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 n.8.
257. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 436-40 (1928); Lawrence S. Kubie,
Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U.
PA. L. RFv. 59 (1959).
258. 112 S. Ct. at 742.
259. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("[A] heavy burden rests
on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel.").
260. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (to show a waiver, the
government must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege").
261. Already in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), Mattox v.
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the White Court pointed to the increased difficulty imposed on a
prosecutor having to amass and hold witnesses, and painted a
dismal picture of all the hardships such a rule would engender,262
the Court ignored the body of jurisprudence that would palliate
the harshness of the rule. Without the White decision, hearsay
evidence from witnesses who meet the "unavailability test" could
still be presented by hearsay exceptions. The witness simply must
be unavailable, due to no fault of thfe state, 263 and the state must
have made a diligent effort to locate the witness. 26 Moreover,
nothing would preclude local jurisdictions from enacting rules of
court requiring pre-trial conferences wherein prosecution and de-
fense counsel would sort out unwanted witnesses and submit
reasons to the court why apparently minor witnesses are required
to attend in person.
The Roberts approach would sidestep the burden imposed upon
the prosecution of requiring all witnesses to be in court. Further,
the Roberts approach would fit neatly into the pre-White case
approach which made unavailability a staple of the Confrontation
Clause.
265
The Roberts approach would enhance the accuracy of the fact-
finding aspect of trial. If all available witnesses are required to be
present in court and subject themselves to cross-examination, the
trier of fact would certainly be in a superior position to judge the
credibility of the testimony, as opposed to instances where the
fact-finder is exposed only to hearsay.
Finally, the Roberts -approach maintains hearsay in its proper
place, an evidentiary rule, not a constitutional device. White would
place the rules of hearsay on a constitutional pedestal. The literal
approach could eviscerate hearsay altogether. The pre-White cases
recognized only three hearsay exceptions. Justice Thomas' ap-
proach is also limited. The Roberts approach incorporates the
strengths and evades the weaknesses inherent in these approaches.
Moreover, under the Roberts approach, the accused would have
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968),
and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 n.22 (1970), the Court had begun
the effort.
262. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
263. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). See generally White,
112 S. Ct. at 742 n.6.
264. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
265. Although co-conspirator statements do not require unavailability, ad-
mission of co-conspirator statements was a common law practice that pre-dated
the clause. See generally supra notes 131-61 and accompanying text.
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some measure of satisfaction that the Confrontation Clause stands
for something.
The Confrontation Clause certainly should stand for some-
thing. At present, it is only a reflex to the rules of evidence. The
Framers intended the Clause to occupy a more prestigious position.
Coupled with the probing device of cross-examination, the require-
ment of face-to-face confrontation was intended to provide the
accused with a meaningful defense. In trials after White, cross-
examination promises to be a hollow right, and face-to-face con-
frontation a vanishing guarantee.
V. CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause was meant to endow an accused
with some right, and some protection. The glare of White makes
it difficult to see any trial protection. The Confrontation Clause
is now basically an automaton for the rules of evidence. The White
Court has lost sight of the hallowed protection that the Clause
was intended to provide. Under White, we return to the same pre-
constitutional evil inflicted on those accused who pleaded for the
Confrontation Clause; the accused will suffer convictions based
upon testimony generated by unseen witnesses who send their
words, instead of their bodies, to court. 26
I have criticized White and its reasoning while exploring other
formulations which may be true to the purpose of the Confron-
tation Clause. The suggested constructions are offered in the fervid
hope that they will produce interest, discussion, and, eventually,
a better formulation of the relationship between the Confrontation
Clause and the rules of hearsay evidence than that presented in
White.
266. The case of Sir Walter Raleigh comes to mind. Viewed by some
historians as one of the principal cases which inspired the Framers to adopt the
Confrontation Clause, Sir Walter's case epitomized the danger of hearsay evi-
dence. Charged with plotting to seize the throne, Sir Walter was convicted on
the strength of an accusatory affidavit submitted by one Lord Cobham, who the
prosecution refused to call as a witness, even though Raleigh had received a
retraction of the accusation from the affiant. See STEPHEN, supra note 12. Fifteen
years after his trial, Sir Raleigh was executed in 1618.
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